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Abstract Growing customer demands and more stringent regulations to reduce
harmful air emissions from ships have resulted in an increased interest for the
installation of shipboard abatement technologies. Specifically, the selective catalytic
reduction (SCR) technology to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) was early
adopted by several Swedish shipping companies. The potential NOx reduction effi-
ciency of the SCR is well established, but the practical experiences of shipboard
installations have been less documented. This paper reviews from a systems perspec-
tive the practical experiences of marine SCR installations in Swedish shipping. The
aim is to identify important not only technical but also human and organizational
conditions necessary for safe, efficient, and sustainable SCR operations at sea.
Further, to investigate to what extent the capabilities and limitations of human
operators and maintainers are taken into account in the design and installation phase
of the systems. Two focus group interviews (n010) and five individual interviews
were held with relevant stakeholders in the industry, following a semi-structured
schedule on the themes installation, operation, maintenance, and training. The results
show that deficiencies in the overall system design—with a combination of technical
issues, maintenance access problems, and untrained operators with inadequate un-
derstanding of the SCR process—have led to inefficient, costly, and unsafe opera-
tions. It is concluded that installations and operations of marine SCR systems, and
possibly other forthcoming abatement technologies, would benefit from the use of
traditional ergonomic principles and methods. This would in turn contribute towards
increased sustainability and a reduced environmental impact from shipping.
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1 Introduction
Growing awareness of environmental implications by global shipping activities has
given rise to an increased focus on strategies for safe, efficient, and sustainable sea
transports (IMO 2011b; OCIMF 2012; INTERCARGO 2012). Great emphasis is
accorded to safety at sea, in terms of prevention of human injury or loss of life and
damage to the marine environment or property (IMO 2002), and efficiency, in
balancing utilized resources (e.g. financial, time, human, or material) against accom-
plished goals (Stopford 2009; Kreitner 2009). Sustainability encompasses all this and
more, requiring the reconciliation of environmental, social equity, and economic
demands (WCED 1987). Using the framework proposed in Cabezas-Basurko et al.
(2008), sustainable sea transports can be seen as “a cost-effective commercial activity,
in which the environmental load is not bigger than that which the environment can
currently and in the future bear, and that the social community (directly and indirect-
ly) in contact with it is not being negatively affected”.
Measures to reduce the marine pollution to air include the development and
implementation of various regional and supranational incentives towards the abate-
ment of emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx). NOx is known to have an impact on the
natural environment, such as eutrophication and acidification at land and sea (Pleijel
2009), and on the public health, primarily through ground-level ozone and secondary
particulate matters (HELCOM 2012; AEA 2009).
The differentiated fairway dues in Sweden and the NOx fund in Norway are two
examples of regional incentives. The environmentally differentiated fairway dues
based on vessel size and emitted NOx were introduced by the Swedish Maritime
Administration in 1998 (SJÖFS 1998:13). The reduced fairway due is given upon the
condition that an emission measurement report, conducted by an accredited measure-
ment institute, is provided to the Administration every third year. The Norwegian
NOx fund was set up in 2007 as a non-profit cooperative effort (NMD 2007). The
participant enterprises are exempted from the NOx tax, while instead obligated to pay
a NOx fee to a fund, from which they can apply for economical support for
installation and operation of NOx abatement technology (NHO 2011).
Although not legally mandatory, these incentives have encouraged installations of
NOx abatement technology on numerous merchant vessels, independent of age;
primarily in the short sea shipping sector with frequent port calls in Swedish and
Norwegian waters. But more stringent legislation is ahead on a supranational level
that is likely to have a great impact on the global shipping community. Most notably,
tier III in the revised convention of marine pollution (MARPOL) Annex VI imply an
approximately 80 % reduction of NOx compared with today’s engines (IMO 2009).
On January 1, 2016, tier III enters into force in designated emission control areas
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(ECA) for all new buildings and vessels undergoing a major conversion. This will
give rise to an increased demand on NOx abatement technology suitable for marine
installations with its harsh environment and strict demands on limited space for the
installation. However, in 2011 at IMO MEPC 62, it was decided to establish a
correspondence group to review the status of the technological developments to
implement the tier III NOx emissions standards (IMO 2011a). The review is to be
completed not later than 2013.
There are several different NOx abatement technologies available on the
market, including internal engine modifications, exhaust gas recirculation,
direct water injection, humid air motor, and selective catalytic reduction
(Entec 2005). However, not all technologies are able to reach tier III by themselves;
some must be used in combination with other technologies. Currently, selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) is considered one of the most effective technologies on
the market that single-handedly can meet tier III (Entec 2005; Lövblad and Fridell
2006; IMO 2012). During the last 15–20 years, SCR has been extensively investi-
gated for reduction of NOx from land-based heavy-duty vehicles (see, for
instance, Heck and Farrauto 1995; Pârvulescu et al. 1998; Koebel et al. 2000;
Gabrielsson 2004). Research and application of marine SCR installations have,
however, remained sparse throughout the years, possibly due to the lack of legal
requirements or other incentives. Further, preceding research and development activ-
ities have primarily focused on technical aspects and engineering principles.
The human and organizational elements within the system have largely been
disregarded.
The advent of mechanization, automation, and communication technology
made many manual tasks redundant, turning the human operator into a
supervisor, rather than a controller of technical systems. Thus, the operators
have moved “out of the loop”, intervening within the control loop primarily
for abnormal situations (Sheridan 2006; Norman 1990). Out-of-the-loop perfor-
mance problems are related to the loss of manual skills and an impaired awareness of
the systems’ state and processes (Endsley and Kiris 1995). As technical systems
increase in complexity, the gap between the human operator and the machine tends to
increase as well. It is difficult for the operators to understand what the technical
systems actually do and how to correctly detect and assess problems. This gap
between human and machine has caused errors, incidents, and accidents affecting
safety and efficiency of operations in several domains, including the maritime (Lee
2006; Reason 1990).
Contemporary SCR units are highly automated, but in order to ensure effective
catalytic NOx reduction, there are still several important technical parameters to
monitor and control during operation, such as exhaust gas temperature and
flow, urea injection and back pressure. Certainly, safe and efficient operation
and maintenance pose demands on the level of knowledge, skills and compe-
tence of the crew as operators and supervisors of the SCR. But, responsibilities
can also be found on management level. In the installation phase, when
ordering and designing an SCR unit, the management is responsible for ensur-
ing that relevant operational requirements are identified and met. During oper-
ations and maintenance, the allocation of adequate resources such as personnel,
time, and materials may be considered.
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1.1 Aim and purpose
The present paper draws from the practical experiences of the pioneering SCR
installations in Swedish short sea shipping. The purpose is to explore the
human–machine aspects of SCR installations from a systems perspective. The
aim is to identify important not only technical, but also human and organiza-
tional conditions necessary for safe, efficient, and sustainable SCR operations.
Further, to investigate to what extent the capabilities and limitations of human
operators and maintainers are taken into account in the design and installation
phase of the systems.
2 Research design
Due to the scarcity of previous research in the problem domain, an explorative,
qualitative research design was adopted. For the purpose of data completeness and,
to a lesser extent, confirmation of data, a combination of focus group interviews and
individual interviews was used (Lambert and Loiselle 2008). This combination of
data collection methods allowed us to elicit rich, detailed information on practical
experiences of marine SCR installations. In order to enable as broad an understanding
of the topic as possible, data collection was made from a range of stakeholder
participants representing different interests and views. All interviews were held in
Swedish and the translation of quotes in this paper is made by the authors.
2.1 Focus group interviews
Focus group interviews are usually characterized by five elements: they involve (1) a
group of people, composed of (2) participants with certain features important to the
researcher, that (3) solicits qualitative data in a (4) carefully planned focused dis-
cussion, in order to (5) gain understanding of the chosen topic through the eyes of the
target audience (Krueger and Casey 2009). The group dynamics and interaction that
occur in focus group interviews are a vital part of the method, using the communi-
cation between research participants to generate data. Instead of a researcher asking
individuals to respond to a series of questions in turn, the participants are encouraged
to, in their own vocabulary, ask each other questions, narrate anecdotes, and comment
on each other’s experiences and points of view (Krueger and Casey 2009). Focus
group interviews are particularly useful for exploring participants’ knowledge and
experiences, probing not only what people think but how they think and why they
think that way (Kitzinger 1995).
Two focus group interviews were held (n010) with top or middle managers
recruited on the basis of their anticipated first-hand knowledge and experiences of
SCR catalysts. The participants represented two different SCR manufacturers, one in
each focus group, and six Swedish shipping companies that have installed SCR
catalysts during the past 15 years, holding a valid NOx certificate issued by the
Swedish Maritime Administration (SJÖFS 1998:13). Together, the shipping compa-
nies represented the segments of liquid bulk, roll on/roll off, passenger, and offshore
supply vessels.
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The two focus groups were moderated by the same, professional moderator with
extensive knowledge on the features and routines of the shipping industry, but
purposely less versed in the technical details surrounding SCR units. Thus, the
moderator had the advantage of being able to instill a sense of mutual respect within
the groups and communicate in a shared vocabulary but still be emotionally detached
from the topic of the study (Krueger and Casey 2009). The authors of this paper acted
as listeners, observers, and analysts.
Both focus groups followed the same semi-structured interview guide with pre-
dominantly open-ended questions about SCR installations on the three themes of the
following:
(1) installation; newbuilding and retrofit, decision making, stakeholder
communication;
(2) operation, service and maintenance; usability, accessibility, manuals, support,
outage, costs; and
(3) knowledge and training; before and after installation, knowledge transfer.
The guide was developed through considerable reflection by the researchers, in
collaboration with the moderator. Each focus group interview lasted for approximate-
ly 90 min and were video- and audio-recorded for transcript and analysis. The focus
groups concluded with the participants anonymously answering a structured ques-
tionnaire to assess if the group discussions had succeeded in capturing the most
important practical experiences on the three themes, respectively, whether the partic-
ipants felt that they had the opportunity to express their opinion, and the potential
usefulness of the discussions to the participants.
2.2 Semi-structured qualitative interviews
Individual interview is a frequently used data collection method in qualitative re-
search and is typically chosen to gather comprehensive accounts of attitudes, views,
and knowledge regarding a given topic. Kvale (1997) describes the qualitative
research interview as a conversation with a structure and a purpose, aiming for
insights and new understandings. The knowledge process in an interview is an
interactive process between interviewer and interviewee. Hence, it is important to
check continuously that the interpretation of the said is accepted by the informant. By
using semi-structured interviews, it is feasible to compare the answers from several
interviews and, to some extent, make some generalizations.
Five individual, semi-structured interviews were held, using the same thematic
interview guide as the focus group interviews, but allowing for flexibility to probe for
details or further discuss issues. Additional questions were asked and answers probed on
an individual basis during the interviews. The informants were not randomly selected,
but chosen among specific stakeholders with experiences considered relevant by the
researchers. The informants were recruited from the Environment and Sustainability unit
at the Swedish Shipowners’ Association; the Transport Policy and International Coop-
eration unit at the Swedish Maritime Administration; a senior technical manager at a
leading marine mutual insurer; an expert consultant with a large buyer of dry cargo
transport; and a vetting coordinator at an oil company. The interviews lasted for
approximately 1 h and were audio-recorded for transcript and analysis.
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2.3 Data analysis
In qualitative research, the dividing line between data collection and data analysis can
be vague, and there are few well-established and generally accepted rules for analysis
(Bryman and Bell 2007). Rather than being a distinct activity following the data
collection, qualitative data analysis occur continuously in a dynamic interplay,
shaping the next phase of data collection by developing new routes of inquiry and
refining questions (Krueger and Casey 2009). The analyzing and interpreting of data
can be described as a process to bring structure, order, and meaning to the data, in
short—making sense of the data. The central elements of analysis in this work is
guided by the strategies described by Mays and Pope (1995) and include transcription
of audio and video recordings and an iterative systematization, categorization, and
recombining of data to look for meanings and causes.
3 Adopting a systems perspective on marine SCR installations
The following section introduces the theoretical framework behind the systems
perspective adopted for analysis in this study followed by some necessary introduc-
tory knowledge on the basic functions of a typical marine SCR installation.
3.1 Systems thinking and sociotechnical systems
Systems thinking constitute an established analytical view of organizations as com-
plex systems made up of interrelated parts coordinated to achieve certain goals and
most usefully studied as a whole. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2006) describe the
elements of a system as follows:
1. Components are the operating parts of a system and consist of input, process, and
output.
2. Attributes are the properties of the components that characterize the system.
3. Relationships are the links between components and attributes.
In the words of the influential philosopher of the systems movement, West
Churchman (1968):
How can we design improvement in large systems without understanding the
whole system, and if the answer is that we cannot, how is it possible to
understand the whole system?
Churchman claimed that, rather than knowing all there is to know about a studied
system, it is important to understand the possible implications of our lack of compre-
hensive knowledge. It is because we never know enough that understanding and critical
judgment become essential, from an intellectual as well as a moral point of view.
Apart from the technical artifacts, human actors and the social infrastructure are
essential for the functionality of the system as a whole, aptly described in the concept
of sociotechnical systems (Emery and Trist 1960). Humans are present in all work
systems, as inventors, designers, users, operators, maintainers, and so forth. Even a
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highly automated system requires people—if there is nothing else to start, stop, and
monitor the system. Often, users and operators also perform service and maintenance
on machinery and equipment in the system. Unlike the other components in the
system, the human actors are free to act and often complete the feedback loop
between system performance and system goal; they correct system failures (Hughes
1987). A sociotechnical system refers to the interdependency of social and technical
aspects in a system. The starting point is a perceived lack of mutual understanding of
the technical society in which engineers allegedly ignore the social concerns of their
work, and social scientists ignore technology. In this respect, a systems model can be
a tool to bring both sides together and portray both social and technical phenomena;
the “technization” of society and the socialization of technology (Ropohl 1999). The
benefits of a sociotechnical system that is designed to take the operators abilities and
limitations into account include reduced learning time for new equipment, fewer
incidents, and accidents related to misuse or misunderstandings, and reduced risk for
musculoskeletal disorders among users.
3.2 Selective catalytic reduction
The SCR technology is based on the selective reaction between ammonia and NOx in
the exhaust gas over a base metal catalyst, where NOx is reduced into elemental
nitrogen (Heck and Farrauto 1995):
4NH3 þ 4NOþ O2 ! 4N2 þ 6H2O
4NH3 þ 2NO2 þ O2 ! 3N2 þ 6H2O:
The main functions of SCR for marine applications involve the injection of a urea
solution in the hot exhaust gasses upstream the catalytic converter (catalyst), which
thermally decomposes to ammonia and reacts with NOx to form nitrogen and water
over a base metal catalyst containing vanadium oxide.
However, under normal pressure and temperatures, ammonia is a highly volatile
gas; hence, the use of urea, as a reducing agent, is favored. When heated, urea
decomposes into ammonia and isocyanic acid where the acid in the presence of water
is further decomposed over the catalyst into ammonia and carbon dioxide (Lundström
2010). The ideal thermal decomposition process of 1 mol of urea gives 2 mol of
ammonia and 1 mol of carbon dioxide (Koebel et al. 2000):
NH2  CO NH2 solidð Þ ! NH3 gasð Þ þ HNCO gasð Þ
HNCO gasð Þ þ H2O gasð Þ ! NH3 gasð Þ þ CO2 gasð Þ:
Further, the choice of base metal in the catalyst is dependent on the operating
temperature, where a vanadium-based catalyst works well in the temperature range of
260–450 °C (Heck and Farrauto 1995). It is therefore commonly used in catalysts for
automotive diesel engines (Koebel et al. 2000) but also for marine applications
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(Lövblad and Fridell 2006) with a reported catalytic NOx reduction efficiency of
90 % (Entec 2005).
However, almost all catalytic materials decay in activity with time where three
major factors are sintering (loss of surface area), attrition (powdering of catalyst,
blocking reactor, reducing gas flow), and poisoning (loss of catalytic activity per unit
area), respectively (Bowker 1998). An important deactivation mechanism for an SCR
catalyst operating downstream a diesel engine, in the presence of ammonium, sulfur,
and water, is the formation of ammonium sulfates which may result in pore blocking
and related catalytic deactivation (Huang et al. 2002, 2003; Zhu et al. 2001; Kijlstra et
al. 1996).
Furthermore, the catalytic NOx reduction efficiency is also dependent upon the
space velocity, which is calculated by dividing the exhaust gas flow (in cubic meters
per hour) with the catalyst volume (in cubic meters) (Heck and Farrauto 1995). It has
been showed that an increased space velocity over a vanadium-based catalyst may
lead to increased deactivation, and Huang et al. (2002) suggest that the deactivation
could be reduced by a decreased space velocity.
Evidently, the SCR installation includes several technical components which have
to be carefully designed in order to work as a well-integrated NOx reducing system.
An example of a typical SCR installation according to DEC Marine AB (2011) is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
4 Results
The two focus groups and the five individual interviews elicited rich and varied
accounts of practical experiences of SCR installations on a management level. Below
is a distilled version of the findings from the focus groups and the interviews,
respectively, structured on the themes of the interview guide: installation, operation,
service and maintenance, and knowledge and training. The following are the results
of the focus group questionnaires.
4.1 Installation of marine SCR catalysts
On the theme of installation of SCR catalysts, the data were sub-divided in the
segments of motives for installation, choosing a supplier, and decision-making
structures.
4.1.1 Motives for installation
Two clear motives for an SCR installation, either a retrofit on an existing vessel
or a newbuilding, emerge: corporate environmental image and commercial
benefits. A main driving force has been meeting customer or cargo owner’s
demands for NOx abatement technology. In some cases, the cargo owner has even
funded the initial SCR installation, while others, depending on charterparty, compen-
sate for the urea.
In an individual interview, a representative for an oil company believes that the
cargo owners are a significant driving force:
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Frankly, I do not think any of the shipowners [that they have contracted] would
have installed any kind of exhaust gas cleaning unless we had put it forward as
a direct demand.
The commercial benefits such as environmentally differentiated fairway dues and
port fees have been effective principally within the RoPax sector (vessels built for
Fig. 1 An example of a typical marine SCR installation according to DEC Marine AB. Used with
permission from DEC Marine AB 2011
A systemic review of shipboard SCR installations in practice 71
both wheeled cargo and passenger transport), with multiple port calls every day and
vessels that spend a lot of time in the fairway. According to a project manager on a
RoPax company, the investment in SCR catalysts on two RoPax vessels had a pay-
back time in just over 2 years. In one focus group, the informants representing two
different tanker companies, however, claimed that the differentiated fairway dues
made little or no difference for them:
Well, you can never get the money back [for the installation]. It is only a cost.
Yes, I agree. Unless you get paid on TC [time charter] or traffic, for example,
the Norwegian coast all the time, there are no incentives what so ever to install
this type of equipment if you do not have a company policy for the environment
and are ready to take this cost, because you will never get the investment cost
back during the prevailing market, as it is now.
The tanker owners both continue to describe how they try to market the
added value to brokers and oil companies, but although there is a candid
interest in environment issues, it is difficult to get the customers to, in fact,
pay extra for the NOx abatement. Conversely, in the individual interview the oil
company representative states that they require all ships on time charter for them to be
equipped with NOx abatement technology. They as charterers pay for the urea
consumption and the costs for installation of SCR are supposedly compensated for
in the contract. Likewise, an informant with offshore supply vessels in their fleet
added that having SCR on board had been crucial when receiving a contract for work
in Alaska.
This limited interest in differentiated fairway dues has also been noted by the
Swedish Maritime Administration that recently has seen a declining number of
applications for renewing NOx certificates.
4.1.2 Choosing an SCR supplier
Generally, for both a retrofit and newbuilding installation, the price is the prime
consideration and the second is how flexible and adaptable the system is to the vessel.
For a retrofit installation on an existing vessel, the informants have mainly used
references from other shipping companies on which SCR supplier to choose, some-
times also in communication with the engine maker. Though, limited space is always
an issue, and the installation can be even further complicated if the vessel was not
built prepared for SCR at an initial design phase.
Conversely, a newbuilding installation is considered to be rather easy and the
SCR supplier is generally chosen from the “makers list” presented by the
shipyard, as of other equipment and machinery. This was especially the view
of the two participating SCR suppliers, who said that they mostly engage with
the shipyards as customers rather than the shipowners directly as is the case for
a retrofit. But, several informants argued that quality and functionality of the
installation depends on the shipyard and the relation between the yard and the
shipowner. One informant described a case where they as shipowners had a
longstanding relationship with a yard they considered to have good technical
competence:
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… basically, we just told them [the yard] which SCR we wanted and then we
did not have anything to do with it until we started it up to check that it worked.
[…] If we had made this installation somewhere else we would have done it in
cooperation with the maker in an entirely different way, but here there was no
reason. They took care of it brilliantly.
Another informant described a similar scenario:
… the problem is, I mean, you have your makers list, but if you do not go down
and specify what you want, it is a bit of a lottery. The primary is not that the
system works, but… as long as the pieces are there, some yards reckon you will
just slide out of the claims period and then the owner has to take the costs to
make the systems actually work.
4.1.3 Decision making
The decision making regarding SCR installations is predominantly made on top
management level in the shore organization. As described earlier, the decision can
be more or less prompted by the customer or cargo owner who, in some cases. also
has been deeply involved in the process, both financially and technically. The end-
users—the crew on board—are however rarely involved.
…the crew have not worked with catalysts before at all, they have no knowl-
edge of it, so we at the office take care of the tenders… in the end we hand over
the papers to the purchasing manager to negotiate the last per cent.
In one case, however, the crew have played a significant part in the process. On a
vessel with one of the first marine SCR installations in Sweden, done in the mid-
1990s, the recent process for replacing the old SCR with a new system was managed
largely by the crew. One of the focus groups had participants from both supplier and
company, one of them working as chief engineer on the vessel. Here, years of trouble-
shooting and efforts to operate the old, regularly malfunctioning SCR system had led
to a somewhat personal relationship between the supplier and crew.
4.2 Operation, service, and maintenance
On the theme of operation, service, and maintenance of SCR catalysts, the data were
sub-divided in the segments of urea supply and quality (an area evidently of great
interest for most informants), technical design issues, operation and operational
disturbances, and service and maintenance.
4.2.1 Urea supply and quality
The supply and quality of urea prompted many discussions in both focus groups, and
the subject was also given ample attention in the individual interviews. Good urea
quality was considered essential for a well-functioning SCR system, generally, the
more expensive, the better the quality. The informants with RoPax vessels operating
in the Baltic Sea reported no problems with either quality or supply, probably due to
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the nature of the traffic enabling them to have standing orders of urea and keep own
depots.
But, informants with vessels with other port calls and vessels trading on the
spot market reported numerous problems with both supply and quality, espe-
cially in ports outside northern Europe. Since urea deliveries commonly are
made by truck from Sweden, the order must be placed in time. For vessels on
the spot market this can turn into a proper logistics challenge with orders being
placed based on an educated guess, trucks having to be rerouted to other ports,
or canceled. Moreover, this has also led to a discussion on how these transports
affect the environment and if, in the end, it can be justified from a life-cycle
perspective. One informant said that under circumstances such as these, they
opt not to operate the SCR.
On several occasions, vessels have received urea that was believed to be destined
for agricultural use, resulting in severe operation disturbances. In an individual
interview, an expert consultant with a dry cargo owner describes how they have
encountered numerous problems due to poor urea quality. In one example, the vessel
was in service for only 60 h before the catalytic blocks were completely clogged and
had to be renewed.
4.2.2 Technical design issues
In any marine SCR installation, the space requirements are kept to an absolute
minimum to ensure maximum cargo carrying capacity. As noted earlier, the
restricted space is especially apparent in retrofitting, and several cases of
conscious sub-optimizations of the SCR installation were described. For exam-
ple, an insufficient exhaust pipe diameter, causing high gas velocities, in
connection to an insufficient distance between the urea injectors and the
catalyst, would not allow for a homogeneous mixture of urea and exhaust
gas, hence resulting in a reduced overall SCR efficiency and the accompanied
difficulties to achieve the NOx emission targets. In another installation, it was
perceived that the supplier had positioned the urea injector rather haphazardly without
giving much thought to the above.
We have seen that it is important where you put the catalyst. It can cause
problem with the exhaust gas temperature, among other things, with too big a
distance between. It amounts to pretty large costs when you have installed the
system if you then have to rebuild it again and then the economists start talking
—should we really go with this, is it worth it?
The operational temperature of the SCR is not reached as quickly as the exhaust
gas temperature. Especially for ships passing through areas with speed limititions,
such as the archipelago, it may take a long time to reach the working temperature
adequate for NOx reduction. Furthermore, the low engine load may lead to accumu-
lation of soot and particles from the exhaust gas on the catalytic blocks, which then
become deactivated. In cases like these, pre-warming of the SCR is necessary, but
that in turn leads to increased emissions of carbon dioxide.
Early SCR systems were claimed to be poorly adapted to the harsh marine
environment, considering vibrations and exhaust gas composition and soot due to
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the type of fuel and lubrication oil commonly used. An example of which were the
early onboard NOx measurement devices:
These NOx analysers, they are also something taken from ashore. Having such a
system up in the funnel with hoses and filters and air… it is far from optimum.
More recent SCR installations are however perceived as being better adapted in
that respect. In one case, it is described how the installation of SCR systems on main
and auxiliary engines even contributed to lower noise levels, a circumstance appre-
ciated by both engine crew and the ports.
4.2.3 Operation and operational disturbances
It was noted during the focus groups and individual interviews that many informants
initially said to have no problems with the SCR and that it supposedly is a very easy
system to operate.
It works very well, in principle you push a button and then you don’t do
anything but fill urea.
However, as time passed during the discussions and interviews, plenty of compli-
cations began to surface with technical components such as urea injectors, air blow-
ers, and urea dosing. Yet, the same informant was still very satisfied with the
operation, revealing tremendous patience:
… it has been 2.5 years now and it has worked without, well I believe this
injector nozzle fell off and broke once and then nothing worked, and some air
blowing jets have broken, but those are small things. The functionality has
been, I mean it runs 100 per cent, except when it shuts down by itself.
Further, it became clear that the chemical process of the SCR is not well known.
Several of the informants gave evidence to the complexity of the SCR system,
picking up the term “hocus-pocus” from an earlier similar statement from another
informant in the same focus group:
… as long as it works, there are no questions asked, but when you are in deep
water—asking what is happening, why is it not working? I have experienced
from both supplier and from our own crew and technical management ashore
that it is a bit of ‘hocus-pocus’, one is guessing, are not really sure—should we
test another type of stones [the metal catalysts]?, and so on. In principle, the
definitive answer does not exist.
The functionality of the SCR is verified officially through the mandatory NOx
certification measurement every third year (SJÖFS 1998:13) for those vessels that
have been granted reduced fairway dues. Some shipping companies have opted to
measure more often while others have no extra monitoring in between these measure-
ments, thus having no control of the functionality of the SCR and the related NOx
reduction over the intermediate time period of 3 years. On the whole, the measure-
ment of NOx and ammonium slip was regarded as costly and cumbersome, especially
concerning the time it takes to get the results. As much as 3–4 weeks have been
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known to lapse between measurement and report, and if the result is not good, the
measurement has to be redone.
4.2.4 Service and maintenance
The lack of space for the installation obviously affects accessibility for maintenance
and service tasks. The system includes a number of parts that need to be changed and
filters to be cleaned regularly, and this was not always well accommodated for in the
design and installation phase. When the catalyst stones need to be changed, this is
done by opening special hatches. Several layers of cassettes of old stones weighing
25–30 kg are removed and new ones put in place, sometimes through a barely
50-cm-wide opening. This hazardous task involves heavy lifting, turning of the
body with a heavy load, and the assuming of awkward body postures with
apparent risk for acute and/or long-term musculoskeletal disorders. Two of the
informants had experienced occupational health and safety incidents during
maintenance work. In one case, four people were hospitalized due to respiratory
problems after changing contaminated stones without protective equipment. In
the other incident, a large steel plate came loose inside the SCR and nearly hit
a welder, missing his head by a few centimeters.
Service instructions and intervals are recorded in typical service manuals. These
are, however, not always written in such a clear and precise manner as the crew would
have wanted. While, on the other hand, the suppliers argue that the manuals are
indeed written for readers assumed to have a certain pre-understanding of technical
and electrical matters. On a RoPax ferry, the crew arranged for the service manual to
be updated after 2 years of operation since they thought the instructions were “poorly
described”.
Although the interviews contained a number of stories ranging from minor oper-
ational failures to severe breakdowns, none of the informants had ever made a claim
to the insurance company. Nor had the informant working as senior manager at a
marine insurer heard of any such claims. The reasons for this can be found in the large
deductible (ranging from US$ 75,000 to 200,000) and the need for the incident
leading up to the potential claim to be a sudden and unexpected event. Hitherto, all
costs associated with these failures and breakdowns, primarily for equipment and
working hours, have therefore been carried by the owner, sometimes together with a
cargo owner. The extra costs for overuse of urea due to mismanagement and/or poor
tuning of the SCR are carried by the owner or cargo owner depending on charterparty.
Examples were also given on long delivery times for spare parts. In one extreme
case, the SCR was inoperable for 9 months, while the vessel had to wait for delivery
of new stones.
4.3 Knowledge and training
Just as the operational problems developed from none to several during the inter-
views, a similar pattern was noted regarding the need for knowledge and training.
Initially, it was unanimously stated that the SCR is not a system that requires any
extra training or knowledge. A vessel contains hundreds of systems with the SCR
being just one of them, and the crew is expected to be able to operate the SCR on the
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basis of their previous engineering experiences. In addition, since the SCR is not a
safety critical system it is not prioritized for special training.
… the vessel moves just as well from A to B without it. So, I believe it takes
some sort of interest and engagement from the people on board, like the chief
engineer; otherwise it is easier to shut it down, then you don’t even have small
problem. It is not like a main engine. A malfunctioning main engine—that is a
huge problem you have to solve. If the SCR is not working, well it is just as
well.
Further, since a shipping company has at least two, sometimes three, persons
employed for each position on board, it is regarded too costly to educate every
operator, including costs such as salary and subsistence allowance. After the initial
installation, the supplier usually instructs the operators that are on board at the time.
The crew are therefore supposed to educate and transfer the knowledge to each other.
Nevertheless, during the interviews, a number of examples on arrangements of
extra training were reported. One company had even engaged a researcher specializ-
ing in combustion technology to give lectures to all engine officers on board:
… we had all engine officers on board there, to give them an understanding for
what happens. No one can explain the catalytic process, it is just there, we have
to accept that, but what happens when you inject urea and what it takes to make
it work and all that, temperatures and such. That, I think is well appreciated.
Then perhaps you get another understanding for how the process works. […]
One needs to have an understanding of what you are doing, because this is
nothing you study at the merchant marine academy.
The same informant continued to describe how they afterwards “kicked out” the
SCR supplier since they now felt that they had more knowledge than the supplier who
could not contribute to the solution of the operational disturbances they experienced.
Both suppliers, on the other hand, expressed a clear interest in operator training. It was
stated by one of the suppliers that they do not consider the SCR installation to be a complete
delivery until they have ensured that a knowledge structure among the crew is in place. At
least one person on board should have specific knowledge on how to operate the SCR.
I know that I can avoid a dreadful amount of telephone calls to me as supplier if
I know that at least one person knows enough.
Among the cargo owners, there was no distinct request for training; rather, it was
taken for granted that the crew had adequate knowledge and training to ensure safe
operation of all systems on board, including the SCR. The external expert with the
dry cargo owner had once, however, participated in a project with a shipowner in
creating generic guidelines for SCR operation that had been communicated to various
stakeholders, among others the Swedish Maritime Administration.
4.4 Results of the structured questionnaire
The six questions in the structured questionnaire aimed to assess if the group
discussions had succeeded in capturing the most important practical experiences on
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the three themes, respectively, and the potential usefulness of the discussions. On the
questionnaire, it was also possible to leave individual statements. This was done by
seven out of ten participants.
Overall, the participants in both focus group interviews considered it rewarding to
participate (Fig. 2). Individual statements indicate the significance of having these
meetings physically, face-to-face. One participant wanted more time for discussion,
another more stakeholders, and a third wanted to exclude the SCR suppliers, thus
potentially opening up the discussions further.
According to the questionnaire responses (Fig. 2), the participants felt that the
focus group discussions succeeded well in capturing the most important practical
SCR experiences regarding installation; operation, service, and maintenance; and
knowledge and training. All participants also said that they had learned something
from the discussions.
Fig. 2 Results from the questionnaires answered after the two focus groups. Rating values and median
values (indicated with an arrow) from ten participants
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5 Discussion
5.1 Methodological considerations
The purpose of this paper was to explore the human–machine aspects of SCR
installations from a systems perspective. In order to obtain a comprehensive under-
standing, the research design included triangulation of methods (Bryman and Bell
2007) by combining focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews. Since
the data collection is based on a limited number of group and individual interviews,
the informant participation is important in that the informants are honest, consistent,
they keep to the subject, and give comprehensive answers (Kvale 1997). There is a
possibility during interviews that the informants might offer answers and reflections
that put themselves and/or the companies they represent in a good light. This
possibility has been considered, and the study has strived for a critical approach in
the analysis of the empirical data. The selection of informants was purposeful rather
than random, and the fact that the authors during the project were approached by
people who volunteered to participate in the focus groups indicates an interest in the
study. Far from all possible stakeholders were included in the study. There were, for
example, no respondents representing classification societies or the inspectorate at the
maritime division of the Transport Agency.
The study is limited by its clear Scandinavian focus with the boundaries set by
prevailing national and regional regulations and conditions. But with the onset of the
Revised MARPOL tier III, the results of this study will be relevant also outside
Scandinavia and underlines the need of considering not only the strict technical
aspects of SCR but also the human-oriented aspects when evaluating the overall
efficiency of SCR.
The results of the two focus group evaluations indicate that the study succeeded in
capturing what was set out to capture; thus, the authors believe the internal validity
(Bryman and Bell 2007) to be good. The results also show that, to a large extent, the
informants felt that they could speak their mind and that they learnt from the
experience pointing towards the usefulness of face-to-face group meetings for creat-
ing common awareness and knowledge transfer.
5.2 Stakeholder relations
One of the most prominent findings to emerge was the importance of rapport (mutual
understanding or trust) between the different actors in the system—supplier, shipyard,
shipowner, cargo owner/customer, and operator. When the dialog is working, it
seems, so is the SCR. This is consistent with, for example, Guinan (1986) who
proposes that communication between designers and users is positively related to the
outcome of the design. In the context of this study, however, it seems that also the
relationship between shipyard and shipowner is of great importance for the outcome.
The informants who have built their ships at yards with which they have long-term
relations have expressed confidence and trust in the yard’s technical competence.
These informants trust the yard to have an honest ambition of making the SCR system
work and not only put the pieces together. But, the mutual trust must work both ways.
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In one example, the yard was said to have stated early on that it was not possible to
build according to specifications. The owner, however, insisted, a number of opera-
tional problems followed, and ultimately, at great expense, a major alteration was
needed.
During the design and installation phase, the knowledge resources of the crew are
not utilized since the crew often lacks previous experience on operating an SCR. This
line of thought, however, does not acknowledge the knowledge on the context in
which the system is about to operate in. A previous research shows several benefits of
involving operators in workplace design. Some benefits are related to the results of
the design, others to the expected gains in the operators’ qualification and motivation,
and some with the functionality of the entire work organization (Launis 2001). In
complex work processes, it is ever more likely that the operator can contribute on the
topic of task execution, work activities, and work environment during normal and
abnormal operations. In addition, the participative design process implies an expan-
sive learning of all stakeholders involved; the operators convey experience and
feedback regarding usage to the designers, and the designers provide understanding
of the system’s function and operation. The mutual understanding supports the
designer in designing more operable systems and the operators to operate them more
efficiently and reliably (Launis 2001). It is therefore suggested that a collaborative
installation process involving both operators on board and technical management in
the shore organization would contribute towards a deeper understanding of how the
SCR works, thus enabling a more efficient NOx reduction. It is believed that this
would be possible for both installations on new buildings and for retrofit installations.
For a newbuilding where the crew have yet to be appointed, it is possible to instead
utilize the knowledge and experiences of other engine officers or cadets that can
represent the “typical users”, as described, for example, in a study involving nautical
cadets in a bridge design process (Österman et al. 2011).
5.3 Maturity of infrastructure and technology
The distribution and quality of urea prompted many discussions during both focus
groups and individual interviews. Informants operating vessels with various port calls
as opposed to a regular schedule had experienced difficulties in ordering and receiv-
ing urea, especially when being rerouted to another port with short notice. Concerns
were also expressed among the informants regarding the net environmental load of
using urea that has been transported by lorry from Sweden to continental Europe.
However, a previous research on environmental trade-offs in NOx removal from ships
suggests that a marine SCR installation gives a considerable decrease in environmen-
tal impact including the transport of urea (Andersson and Winnes 2011). On the topic
of urea quality, a quality standard similar to the standard for land-based applications is
supposedly under way also for marine use and would likely be beneficial for the
quality of SCR operations.
During the focus groups and individual interviews, the success stories were far
outnumbered by the stories of things falling apart, clogged stones, and ineffective
NOx reduction. Even the cases where the SCR reportedly ran without problem turned
out to have room for improvements, suggesting a high threshold for problems among
the informants. One is so used to face technical complications that it takes a lot to
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acknowledge that there is a problem. This phenomenon, a normalization of the
conditions can have social or psychological reasons. One form of normalization is
the so called system evolution (Backström 1996) where the human continuously
adapts to small, solitary changes in a system that slowly becomes more and more
unstable without anyone really noticing. When an accident or breakdown suddenly
occurs, it is often described as a bolt out of the blue.
The findings suggest that many of the difficulties of operating SCR systems can be
found in the design and installation phase. The SCR is seemingly viewed more or less
as a “black box”, with no one to tell what actually happens inside. The system
builders appear to lack sufficient knowledge on the importance of the urea injection
design and exhaust gas velocity over the catalysts for a well-functioning SCR; this
can, in turn, lead to costly, sub-optimized installations with poor NOx reduction.
Drawing from the interview results, it seems that this built-in sub-optimization
occasionally may have been conscious.
The restricted space on board not only affects the technical functionality, in terms
of correct exhaust gas velocity and placing of urea injectors for an efficient thermal
decomposition and subsequent catalytic reduction, but it was also found to affect the
accessibility for routine and repair work increasing the risk for human errors and
occupational accidents. To accommodate for the limited space, it is therefore sug-
gested that traditional human factors engineering tools, such as methods for analyses
of tasks, functions, and interfaces analyses (Stanton et al. 2005), are used routinely.
5.4 Knowledge and training
On the theme of knowledge and training, a lack of structure for knowledge transfer
was identified. Since the SCR is regarded neither as safety critical nor as a particu-
larly complex system—despite the several expressions of how incomprehensible the
catalytic process is—no special training is required, and no special training courses
are offered by the SCR suppliers beyond the introduction at the initial start-up. This
requires that for good functionality and efficiency, the SCR installation, in general,
and its user interfaces, in particular, must be designed for good guessability (it is easy
to correctly guess how something works and what happens is, for example, a certain
button is pushed) and learnability (it is easy for the operator to learn how it works and
remember correct actions) (Jordan 1998).
Moreover, it was found that the crew was expected to transfer the knowledge to
colleagues and successors, something that demands that the instructor possess ped-
agogical as well as technical skills. To adequately transfer knowledge, one must have
a thorough understanding of how the SCR works, and also dedicated time, since the
SCR is but one of many systems to master for an engine officer.
It is further believed that more knowledge is needed on a number of technical
aspects that appear to affect the functionality of the SCR. Future experiments are
needed to assess the impact of various types of urea qualities and also the effect on
exhaust gas composition of different types of marine fuel and lubrication oils
commonly used. Today, the vessels take active part in the development of SCR
systems for marine applications, both technically and economically. The costs for
malfunctioning SCR installations are carried chiefly by the shipping company,
sometimes in collaboration with the cargo owner. The costs are primarily associated
A systemic review of shipboard SCR installations in practice 81
with necessary re-designs, material, working hours, energy, and waste, such as
overuse of urea or catalyst stones not operating its full estimated service life. For
inefficient or non-existent NOx reduction, when the problems have escalated to a
decision to simply shut the SCR off, the costs can also be measured on a societal level
in terms of unhealthy emissions to air and increased eutrophication and acidification
at land and sea.
It is fair to believe that many human, technical, and organizational aspects
identified in this study can be transferred to other existing and forthcoming marine
systems on board. On the topic of environmental technology, the near future sees a
number of pending installations such as marine scrubber systems to remove sulfur
dioxide from exhaust gas and water treatment systems to remove organisms from
ballast tanks.
6 Conclusions
The present study contributes to the body of knowledge on marine SCR installations
by adding a systems perspective of the installation, comprising technical, human, and
organizational conditions for safe, efficient, and sustainable operations of SCR
catalysts on ships.
Although the actual NOx reduction with marine SCR catalysts is high in successful
installations, there are still technical and operational issues that need to be resolved
for forthcoming SCR installations. Principally regarding the supply and quality of
urea, the design, and placing of urea injection, and exhaust gas composition due to
various marine fuels and lubrication oils.
The results indicate that there are currently no structures or procedures in place to
ensure that physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations of the human operators
and maintainers are taken into account in the design process. Also lacking is a
structure for training and the development and transfer of knowledge on how the
SCR works and how to properly operate and maintain the SCR. This absence of
structures and procedures are a contributing source to the common operational
disturbances with an increased risk for occupational accidents and unnecessary
harmful air emissions to the environment. The costs for this are carried by ship-
owners, cargo owners, and the society.
In conclusion, using traditional ergonomic principles and methods in the design
and installation process of marine SCR systems, and possibly other forthcoming
abatement technologies, would contribute towards an improved overall system per-
formance. It would also contribute towards reaching future environmental targets
regarding NOx emissions from short sea shipping.
In general, it seems that clear and concise incentives are needed for instal-
lation and operation of marine SCR: either regulations, customer demands, or
other commercial benefits. Unless incentives are in place, the development will
stall. The regulations must be enforced on an international level to ensure
competition on equal grounds.
Further, it is believed that the face-to-face focus group meetings had a positive
impact on the common awareness among the shipowners and the SCR manufacturers,
creating improved dialog and knowledge transfer between the stakeholders.
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7 Further work
Further work is needed on the issue of marine SCR installations. Proposed areas of
continued research includes flow reactor experiments using different types of urea as
a NOx-reducing agent and flow reactor experiments, where the exhaust gas compo-
sition is varied by the use of different marine fuel standards.
Continued research is also needed on the topic of incorporating ergonomic meth-
ods and principles in the toolboxes of naval architects, ship designers, and suppliers
of marine equipment, as well as on the topic of end-user participation in ship design.
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